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GENDER AND PARENTHOOD: THE CASE FOR 
REALIGNMENT 
Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani∗ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For those not intimately involved, one of the delights of the burgeoning reproductive 
business is the glittering constellation of ethical and legal questions reproductive medicine 
poses for us. Some of those questions, endlessly debated, are deeply philosophical (and for 
some of us theological). What is the nature of human life itself? Does possessing human 
DNA have any moral significance? Others require us to reflect on just what intrinsic rights 
are involved in procreation. Few might dissent from a rhetorical assertion that men and 
women have a right to found a family. Begin to debate what that right entails and who 
enjoys it and dispute resurfaces. Yet other questions are, for lawyers, delightfully technical 
as much as morally significant. Before 1979, paternity might on occasion be dubious, but 
even a rather dim child generally knew his mother.1 
 
In discussions of procreative autonomy and reproductive liberty the rights of 
many have been examined. Whether infertile couples2, single and lesbian women3, 
prisoners4 and even HIV discordant individuals5 should be assisted in their desires to 
procreate has all attracted attention and academic debate. One group that continues to 
                                                
∗ Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, 
University of Manchester. We would like to thank Neil Allen, John Coggon, Simona Giordano, 
Suzanne Ost and two anonymous reviewers from the journal. Sheelagh McGuinness gratefully 
acknowledges the support of the Arts & Humanities Research Council. 
1 M. Brazier ‘Regulating the Reproduction Business?’ (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 166-193 at 168. 
2 B. Steinbock ‘Regulating assisted reproductive technologies: an ethical framework’ (1996) 6 Womens 
Health Issues 167–174; J. Harris, Clones, Genes, and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998) at 233. 
3 E. Sutherland, ‘Man Not Included – Single Women, Female Couples and Procreative Freedom in the 
UK’ (2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly, 155; G Hanscombe, ‘The Right to Lesbian 
Parenthood’ (1983) 9 Journal of Medical Ethics 135. 
4 J. Williams, ‘The Queen on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Prisoners and artificial insemination - Have The Courts Got It Right?’ (2002) 14 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 218-228; Dickson v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 44362/04) [2007] 3 FCR 877; 
Helen Codd, ‘Policing Procreation: Prisoners, Artificial Insemination and the Law’ Genomics, Society 
and Policy (2006) Vol.2, No.1, pp.110–117. 
5 S. Sharma et al. ‘Assisted Conception in couples with HIV Infection’ (2003) 79 Sex Transm Infect 
185-188 at 187; A. Drapkin Lyerly & J. Anderson, ‘Human immunodeficiency virus and assisted 
reproduction: reconsidering evidence, reframing ethics’ (2001) 75 Fertility and Sterility 843-858 at 
849; A. Apoola et al ‘Access to infertility investigations and treatment in couples infected with HIV: 
questionnaire survey’ (2001) 323 British Medical Journal, 1285. 
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be neglected in such discussions comprises individuals who have undergone sex 
reassignment surgery. The government’s decision to overhaul the legal framework 
regulating assisted reproduction reignited much debate on issues surrounding assisted 
conception and the rules relating to parenthood.6 In these discussions we see a chance 
being missed to consider the needs of transsexuals. In our paper we address this 
lacuna, and highlight the needs of this group in the context of assisted reproduction 
and parenthood. We consider whether there is any reason to refuse transsexuals the 
same options as other individuals in the context of assisted reproductive technologies. 
We examine whether such individuals who may wish to found a family are being 
hindered rather than helped by the current legal framework. 
  Transsexuals, as a consequence of opting for sex reassignment surgery, lose 
their ‘natural’ reproductive capacities. This is not because reproduction is impossible; 
to the contrary, prior to surgery, transsexuals can be counselled about having their 
gametes frozen and stored for later use. As science advances, more options will 
become available for transsexual individuals.7  What harms might children brought up 
by these people suffer as a result of their influence? The reproductive options of 
transsexuals, and whether they ought to be assisted in their desire for children, is 
neglected in legal and ethical discourse. Why are transsexuals, prior to surgery which 
                                                
6 See Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for revised legislation 
(including establishment of the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos), Cm 6989, December 
2006; Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill (Cm 7087); Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, Draft HL Paper 169-I and HC Paper 630-I; Written and oral evidence published 
as Volume II. Government Response to the Report from the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, Cm 7209; Most recently Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]. We 
will use the new proposed legislation which the government is considering as a starting point for our 
discussion. The time is ripe to address the present deficiencies and allow individuals who have 
undergone sex reassignment surgery to achieve their potential for genetic parenthood should they 
desire it. At the time of writing this, it seems however that this is something that is going to be 
overlooked. 
7  W. Fageh et el, ‘Transplantation of the human uterus’ (2002) 76 International Journal of 
Gynaecology & Obstetrics, 245-251; I. Evans, ‘Womb transplants could be two years away, experts 
claim’ The Times, 05/09/2006.  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8122-2342896,00.html Accessed on 20/11/2006. 
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will affect their ability to reproduce, not being counselled on fertility preservation or 
reproductive choices available to them?8 
Our paper will have two principal foci. Firstly, we will examine whether there 
are any justifications for not barring transsexuals from assisted reproductive 
technologies. In the absence of such justifications, we shall consider what should be 
done to remove discriminatory practice in this area and to widen the options available 
to transsexuals wishing to take advantage of reproductive technologies.9 The second 
part of our paper will analyse the challenges posed by current legal definitions of 
parenthood to those transsexuals who wish to reproduce. We believe that the current 
legislation is unable to deal satisfactorily with this issue. There are those who may 
believe that transsexuals are not a ‘suitable’ category of parent. Similar arguments to 
those that were at different stages in the past aimed at ‘adulterous’ women and 
homosexuals are now reserved for transsexuals.10 These arguments have been shown 
to hold little weight in the past11 and the few studies that have been carried out 
suggest that they are unlikely to hold weight in the present discussion either.12  
 
 
 
                                                
8 W. Meyer, et al. ‘The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders-Sixth Version’ (2001) 5 
International Journal of Transgenderism http://www.symposion.com/ijt/soc_2001/index.htm Accessed 
on 08/01/2007. 
9 The focus of this paper will be attempts to remove discrimination in practice. We will not focus on 
legal measures against discrimination. 
10 D. S. Dooley, ‘Immoral because they are bad, bad because they are wrong: Sexual orientation and 
presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes’, (1990) 26 California Western Law Review, 
395-424; Judith G. Fowler ‘Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases’, (1995) 33 Family 
And Conciliation Courts Review, 361-376. 
11  S. Golombok et al, ‘Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosexual and 
Psychiatric Appraisal’ (1983) 24 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 551-572; R.W Chan et 
al, ‘Psychological Adjustment among children conceived via donor insemination by lesbian and 
heterosexual mothers’ (1998) 69 Child Development 443-457. 
12 R. Green, ‘Sexual Identity of 37 Children raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents’ (1978) 135 
American Journal of Psychiatry 692-697; R. Green, ‘Transsexuals’ Children’ (1998) 2 The 
International Journal of Transgenderism http://www.symposium.com//ijt/ijtc0601.htm Accessed on 
08/11/2007.  
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II. EQUAL TREATMENT 
Transsexualism is an extreme form of gender dysphoria.13 An individual with 
transsexualism is born with the primary and secondary sexual characteristics opposite 
to that of their gender. Brothers and Ford give the following definition: 
 
…a persistent desire to be of the opposite sex combined with persistent discomfort about 
one’s assigned sex or gender role. The diagnosis requires the absence of physical intersex 
conditions and the presence of clinically significant distress or impairment of psychological 
function.14  
 
The gender of these individuals remains constant. It is their sex which is changed 
during reassignment surgery and hormone therapy to match their gender.15 This 
process, often referred to as ‘transitioning’, leads to the loss of an individual’s natural 
reproductive capacity.16 Assisted reproduction offers many options which transsexual 
individuals could use in order to preserve their reproductive capacities. These are 
options regularly used by cancer patients, about to go through treatment which will 
render them infertile.17 The standards for treatment of transsexualism are set out in the 
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association Standards of Care. 
These guidelines have recently included reference to the importance of reproductive 
                                                
13 P. De Sutter ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction; Present and future reproductive 
options for transsexual people’ (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 612-614 at 612. It is also a mental 
disorder as per F64.0 of the ICD-10. 
14  D Brothers & W. C Ford ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction: An ethical analysis’  
(2000) 15 Human Reproduction 737-738. 
15 For the purposes of this paper we will take gender to be primarily a psycho-social concept and sex 
primarily to be a biological feature. For a discussion of this in relation to the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 see J. Coggon, N. Hammond and S. Holm, ‘Transsexuals in Sport- Fairness and Freedom, 
Regulation and Law’, Sports, Ethics and Philosophy, (Forthcoming 2008). 
16 P. De Sutter ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction; Present and future reproductive 
options for transsexual people’ (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 612-614 at 612.    
17 Consider the recent discussion about the lack of funding available for cancer fertility services for 
cancer patients: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7187291.stm Accessed 07/02/2008; 
http://www.cancerbackup.org.uk/News/Mediacentre/Pressreleasesstatements/2008/96619968 Accessed 
07/02/2008; http://www.politics.co.uk/press-releases/royal-colleges-say-nhs-should-fund-fertility-
services-cancer-patients-$484202.htm Accessed 07/02/2008; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/jan/15/nhs.cancer Accessed 07/02/2008. 
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options for transsexuals.18 Transsexuals should have the same reproductive rights as 
other categories of people who need assisted reproduction in order to have children. 
What such rights entail are not the focus of this paper, instead we will consider the 
(un)equal treatment of transsexuals.19  
There is some evidence which suggests that transsexuals are not being 
counselled about their reproductive options pre-operatively.20 This may be due to the 
fact that in the past infertility was seen as a ‘price to pay’ for transitioning - being a 
transsexual and being a parent were seen as mutually exclusive.21 We reject the notion 
that transsexuals have in some way chosen to be infertile and that this negates their 
rights to access artificial reproductive technologies. It is, correctly we believe, no 
longer accepted that same sex couples have somehow waived any options to parent by 
the mere fact they have elected to be in a relationship where natural reproduction is 
not possible.22 Nor do patients who elect treatment that may affect their fertility waive 
their reproductive interests; it is recognised that patients undergoing cancer treatment 
should be counselled about fertility preservation techniques.23 Transsexuals should 
not be deemed to have chosen to be infertile by opting for a treatment that results in 
infertility. And nor should transsexuals be excluded from parenting simply because 
they have elected for sex reassignment surgery.  
                                                
18 The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Associations Standards Of Care For Gender 
Identity Disorders- Sixth Version at 17. 
19  For the views of one of the authors on reproductive liberty see A. Alghrani & J. Harris 
‘Reproductive Liberty: Should the foundation of families be regulated?’ (2006) 18 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 191-210. 
20 P. De Sutter et al  ‘The Desire to have Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual 
Women: A Survey’ (2001) 6 The International Journal of Transgenderism 
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no03_02.htm Accessed on 08/01/2007. 
21 P. De Sutter ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction; Present and future reproductive 
options for transsexual people’ (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 612-614 at 612.  
22 See the provisions for same sex parents in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. 
23 Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Radiologists, Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists. The effects of cancer treatment on reproductive functions: guidance and management. 
Report of a Working Party. (London: RCP, 2007). 
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Transsexuals using their own gametes post-operatively may cause problems for 
the definitions of ‘parent’ under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, which 
may soon be substantially amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. 
In the discussions (so far) of the proposals contained in the Bill there has been little, if 
any, mention of transsexuals. Transsexuals seeking to store gametes for future use 
may encounter problems in gaining access to treatment in a licensed clinic as it is 
unclear whether a clinic would be prepared to facilitate this procedure. The fact that 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004 has only recently come into force means that there 
have been only speculative suggestions that this Act makes it possible for transsexuals 
to be named as mother or father on birth certificates in accordance with their acquired 
gender.24 This recognition depends on how section 12 of the Gender Recognition Act 
is interpreted – something discussed further later in this paper.  
 
A. Transsexuals’ Reproductive Choices 
Most pre-operative transsexuals will be fertile in the sense that their 
reproductive organs will be fully functioning. They will have viable eggs or sperm. 
Post-operatively they will be irreversibly infertile.25  
 
1. Transsexual women 
                                                
24 S. Sheldon ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review  523-553; L. Smith ‘Is three a crowd? Lesbian mothers’ perspectives on parental 
status in law’ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 231-252. Both Sheldon and Smith suggest, in 
footnotes, that in the wake of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, s.28 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act would allow for a female-male transsexual to be recognised as the father of a child. 
This would be premised on his position as the male partner in a recognised heterosexual relationship. 
Later in this article we discuss this possibility further. Neither Sheldon nor Smith discuss this 
possibility in much detail. The situation may be complicated if a male-female transsexual wished to use 
her own gametes. 
25  P. De Sutter ‘Gender reassignment and assisted reproduction’ (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 612-
614 at 612. 
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For transsexual women (male to female transsexuals) there are two main ways 
by which they can realise their reproductive potential. The first is through the 
cryopreservation of sperm prior to surgery.  Sperm could be stored for use at a later 
date, which would mean she could still have a genetically related child. For 
transsexual women who identify as lesbians the most straightforward option will be 
artificial insemination of their partner.26 Evidence suggests that many in this group 
would be interested in this option.27 Transsexual women may alternatively wish to 
consider surrogacy (or partial surrogacy).28 Her gametes could also be used to fertilise 
a donor egg which would then be implanted in a surrogate and carried to term. The 
use of a surrogate may prove more difficult as there is a need first to find an 
individual willing to act in this capacity and possibly also to secure donor eggs. 
Furthermore, there is the need to ask a licensed clinic to implant an embryo, produced 
through IVF of the donor egg, into the surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority’s Code of Practice permits licensed clinics to become involved 
in surrogacy only where “no person commissioning the surrogacy arrangement is able 
to carry a child or, where a person commissioning the arrangement is able to carry a 
child, her health may be seriously impaired by doing so”.29 Surrogacy agreements are 
not legally binding on either party in the UK;30 thus the commissioning surrogate can 
renege on the agreement prior or subsequent to the birth. And the surrogate, as the 
woman who gives birth to the baby, is deemed to be the legal mother.31 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 A. Lawrence ‘Meeting the Reproductive Needs of Transsexual Patients’ The 2nd International 
Congress on Sex and Gender Issues 21/06/1997 http://www.annelawrence.com/repro.html. 
28 Surrogacy is “the practice whereby one woman carries a child for another with the intention that the 
child should be handed over after birth.” - Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Warnock Committee Report), Cmnd. 9314, 1984, para 8.1. 
29 HFEA Code of Practice 7th edition, S.7.6.9. 
30 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
31  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 27(1) “The woman who is carrying or has 
carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, 
is to be treated as the mother of the child.” Clause 33 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
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The second option which may become possible in the near future is womb 
transplantation. Scientists in the US are working on attaining the first human 
pregnancy as a result of a womb transplant.32 If womb transplants become a safe 
procedure, this would allow transsexuals to experience gestation and pregnancy and 
fully identify with their now recognised sex. Consider the following comment from 
Paul De Sutter: 
 
…quite a few women answered that having their own child is one thing, but that being 
pregnant and giving birth is what they would love most of all. Many transsexual women 
feel that the impossibility of biological motherhood is one of the major features missing 
from their femaleness. They would be more interested in future options of uterine 
transplantation techniques than in sperm freezing.33 
 
 
2. Transsexual men 
Transsexual men (female to male transsexuals) have similar options; they 
could undergo hormone-induced super-ovulation and ova retrieval pre-operatively. 
The ova could then be stored, or alternatively, through IVF, the eggs could be 
fertilised with donor sperm, and embryos frozen for use post surgery.34 These 
embryos may subsequently be implanted into a surrogate to be gestated, or implanted 
in a female partner.35  
 
                                                                                                                                       
re-enacts this section. “It will remain the case that the woman who carries a child following assisted 
reproduction anywhere in the world is the child’s mother, unless the child is subsequently adopted or 
parenthood is transferred through a parental order.”, See the Explanatory Notes for the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill at p.29. 
32 See M. Hutchinson, BBC News “Womb transplant baby 'within three years'” Tuesday, 1 July, 2003. 
Accessible at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3035628.stm and  L. Andrews, “Male Pregnancy Is In 
the Future” The Daily Princeton Wednesday May 8 2002. Accessible at 
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2002/05/08/opinion/5154.shtml. 
33 P. De Sutter et al ‘The Desire to have Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual 
Women: A Survey’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Transgenderism 
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no03_02.htm Accessed on 08/01/2007. 
34 All of this depends on a licensed clinic being prepared to facilitate it. 
35  A. Lawrence ‘Meeting the Reproductive Needs of Transsexual Patients’ The 2nd International 
Congress on Sex and Gender Issues 21/06/1997 http://www.annelawrence.com/repro.html. 
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B. The Crux of the Issue: Should Transsexuals be Allowed to Parent? 
 What of the welfare of any child born to a transsexual parent? The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 is founded upon ‘twin pillars’36 : child 
welfare,37  and consent to treatment.38 For the former, section 13(5) of the Act 
currently imposes a mandatory condition on treatment licences, requiring that: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of 
the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need 
of that child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth.39 
 
Much literature has emerged expressing concern with regard to the interpretation of 
this statutory ‘welfare principle’.40 Is it being used as a smoke screen to hide 
prejudices regarding the parental fitness of prospective patients? As the welfare of the 
child is of paramount concern, might it be questioned whether transsexuals can 
                                                
36 S. Sheldon, ‘Case Commentary Evans v Amicus Healthcare; Hadley v Midland Fertility Services – 
Revealing cracks in the “twin pillars”?’ (2004) 16 (4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 437 – 452. 
37 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s. 13(5). 
38 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, Schedule 3. 
39 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority is required to provide guidance on this 
provision via its code of practice for licence-holders. In relation to the need for a father, the current 
guidance states: “Where the child will have no legal father the treatment centre is expected to assess the 
prospective mother’s ability to meet the child’s/children’s needs and the ability of other persons within 
the family or social circle willing to share responsibility for those needs.” (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority Code of Practice, 7th Edition, paragraph G.3.3.3.) . The new Bill will remove 
‘the need of the child for a father’ from this section. 
40 E. Jackson, “Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle' (2002) 65 MLR 176; S. Millns 
“Making Social Judgements that Go Beyond the Purely Medical: The Reproductive Revolution and 
Access to Fertility Treatment Services” in J. Bridgeman and S. Millns (eds) Law and Body Politics: 
Regulating the Female Body (Dartmouth 1995), E. Sutherland, ‘Man Not Included – Single Women, 
Female Couples and Procreative Freedom In The UK’ 15 (2) (2003) Child and Family Law Quarterly 
155. 
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adequately provide for the welfare of any future children?41 This is a concern that has 
been echoed by transsexuals themselves. Paul De Sutter describes this feeling: 
Other individuals believe they would not be good parents and would therefore choose not to 
have children anyway. They believe the psychological trauma they had to go through 
because of their gender dysphoria would impair a normal parent-child relationship.42  
However this lack of self-confidence must not be mistaken for proof that this group 
would be unsuitable parents. There is nothing to suggest that a parent who has 
undergone reassignment surgery is necessarily mentally imbalanced or that being a 
transsexual will necessarily affect their ability to parent a child. Evidence 
demonstrates that post-operative transsexuals are much happier and, arguably, are in a 
better state to parent (although they may now need assistance) than they would have 
been had they not had the surgery.43 Consider the following quote from Brothers and 
Ford supporting this contention, in which they cite Pierre Banzet, a surgeon who 
specializes in sex reassignment surgery:  
… with rigorous selection, gender reassignment offers the prospect of long term 
psychological health. He described operations on 98 males and 68 females over the past 15 
years, all of whom were subjected to a thorough diagnosis with a rigid selection system to 
                                                
41 P. Banzet & M. Revol ‘The Surgical Experience’ (1996) 180 Bull. Acad. Natl. Med. 1395-1402 as 
quoted in D Brothers & W. C Ford ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction: An ethical 
analysis’ (2000) 15 Human Reproduction 737-738 at 737. 
42 P. De Sutter et al ‘The Desire to have Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual 
Women: A Survey’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Transgenderism 
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no03_02.htm Accessed on 08/01/2007; A. Lawrence, ‘Factors 
Associated With Satisfaction or Regret Following Male-to-Female Sex Reassignment Surgery’ (2003) 
32, Archives of Sexual Behavior, 299–315; G. De Cuypere et al Long-term follow-up: psychosocial 
outcome of Belgian transsexuals after sex reassignment surgery (2006) 15 Sexologies, 126-133. All 
these citations suggest that sex reassignment surgery offers an improvement in psychological 
functioning. However it seems to be true that the incidence of suicide amongst post-operative 
transsexuals is higher than that of the general population. Whether this necessarily justifies prohibitions 
on treatment on the basis of the welfare of the child remains unclear. The final study cited, which is 
also the most recent, suggests that certain factors influence the incidence of suicide including the age of 
the individual when they first appear for treatment and the acceptance that they receive post-
operatively. This suggests to us that improved access to sex reassignment surgery and societal 
acceptance of transsexuals may lead to lower incidence of suicide over time. However we acknowledge 
the role that hormone treatments may have on the incidence of suicide. Given this uncertainty we 
suggest that a blanket prohibition on treatment will be inappropriate although in some cases treatment 
may be legitimately refused. 
43  P. De Sutter ‘Gender reassignment and assisted reproduction’ 2001 16 Human Reproduction 612-
614.    
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ensure that the individual had intact reality awareness and stable ego strength.  In every 
case the outcome after surgery was positive.44  
Others who have carried out research in the field have come to similar conclusions.45 
There is little evidence to support the notion that a child is harmed by having a 
transsexual parent. Although there are very few studies of children raised by 
transsexual parents, those that exist show that such children do not fare any less well 
than children reared in other family units.46 There is no evidence to indicate a child’s 
welfare would be adversely affected by being raised by a parent who has undergone 
sex reassignment surgery. Unless clear evidence can be provided to show that harm 
would result from being raised by a transsexual parent, or that the child’s welfare 
would be adversely affected, reproductive assistance should be available to such 
individuals. Transsexualism in itself should not automatically debar an individual 
from accessing assisted reproductive technologies.47  
C. The Importance of Preserving Fertility 
In other areas of medical practice it is seen as good practice to counsel patients 
about the fact that their treatment may cause them to become infertile. They are also 
told of the options available to them before their therapy begins. A prime example is 
the guidance from The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine on the treatment of cancer patients. As chemotherapy may result in a loss of 
the patient's reproductive capacities, good practice for treating cancer patients 
encompasses offering options for sperm and ova retrieval to be stored for future use 
                                                
44 D Brothers and W. C Ford ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction: An ethical analysis’ 
(2000) 15 Human Reproduction 737-738 at 737. 
45  L. Webster ‘Female to male gender reassignment’ (1998) 25 Br.J.Sex.Med. 8-10.  
46 R. Green, ‘Sexual Identity of 37 Children raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents’ (1978) 135 
American Journal of Psychiatry 692-697; R. Green, ‘Transsexuals’ Children’ (1998) 2 The 
International Journal of Transgenderism http://www.symposium.com//ijt/ijtc0601.htm Accessed on 
08/11/2007. 
47 D Brothers & W. C Ford ‘Gender Reassignment and assisted reproduction: An ethical analysis’ 
(2000) 15 Human Reproduction 737-738 at 738. 
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and, in some cases, more experimental therapies. This is seen as being in accordance 
with acting in the patients’ best interests.48 Pre- treatment discussions regarding future 
infertility and options to preserve the chance to reproduce are made available to 
young children. Such counselling is even, in some circumstances, offered to pre-
pubescent children, albeit with the cautionary note for sensitivity and tact.49 It is 
indicative of the value placed on reproduction that we think clinicians ought to go to 
such lengths to preserve the reproductive capacities of children, and consider options 
as radical as the cryopreservation of testicular and ovarian tissue, even though this is 
a group so young that reproduction could not have been further from their 
contemplation. ‘Good practice’ in the treatment of young cancer patients highlights 
the importance placed on preserving, where possible, future reproductive choices. 
Similar standards exist in the UK.50  The needs of this group have also been 
considered at law. The difficulty with obtaining a valid consent (to the storage of their 
gametes) from minors led to recommendations that the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act be amended.51 Thus the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
proposes:52 
 
 “Cases where consent not required for storage 
9 (1) The gametes of a person (“the child donor”) may be kept in storage without            
the child donor’s consent if the following conditions are met. 
 
                                                
48 ‘Fertility preservation and reproduction in cancer patients’ The Ethics Committee of the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/FertilityPreservation.pdf p.2 
Accessed 27/06/2007. 
49 ‘Fertility preservation and reproduction in cancer patients’ The Ethics Committee of the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/FertilityPreservation.pdf p.4 
Accessed 27/06/2007. 
50 ‘Managing the treatment of male fertility patients- RCN Guidance for oncology and haematology 
nurses’  
http://www.rcn.org.uk/publications/pdf/managing_fertility_male_cancer_patients.pdf  Accessed 
27/06/2007. 
51 Review of the Common Law Provisions Relating to the Removal of Gametes and of the Consent 
Provisions in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts 1990 (HMSO London 1997) para. 2.6.   
52 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL] Schedule 3, section 12. 
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(2) Condition A is that the gametes are lawfully taken from or provided by the   child 
donor before the child donor attains the age of 18 years. 
 
(3) Condition B is that, before the gametes are first stored, a registered medical 
practitioner certifies in writing that the child donor is expected to undergo medical 
treatment and that in the opinion of the registered medical practitioner- 
(a) the treatment is likely to cause a significant impairment of the fertility of the 
child donor, and 
(b) the storage of the gametes is in the best interests of the child donor. 
 
That it is seen as appropriate that such steps be taken in order to facilitate the 
preservation of fertility of young cancer patients highlights the extent to which the 
needs of transsexuals are being overlooked. We suggest that such counselling should 
be considered necessary when acting in the patient’s best interests. 
The importance of fertility is clearly recognised in the context of patients 
electing cancer therapy which may impair their fertility, and guidance recommends 
that such patients should be counselled on their fertility preservation. We recommend 
that clinicians also bear in mind that transsexuals undergoing gender reassignment 
surgery should similarly be informed and counselled on fertility preservation and 
artificial reproductive technologies which are be available to them. 
III. REDEFINING PARENTHOOD 
Legal rules governing parenthood were in the past predicated on biological 
essentialist criteria for motherhood and common law presumptions about marriage for 
fatherhood.53 The changes proposed in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
will go some way to bridging the gaps that exist in the law at present but problems 
remain. Although much discussion and attention is given to the definition of parents 
                                                
53 S. Edwards Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (London, Blackstone Press Limited, 1996) . 
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in the Bill before Parliament, the needs of transsexuals are not considered at all, nor 
were they considered in the report of the Joint Committee54 on the initial draft Bill.  
 
A. Past 
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the 
jurisprudence relating to transsexual parents was confusing as we can see from the 
following case. X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom55 dealt with the question of whether a 
transsexual male could be acknowledged as the father on the birth certificate of a 
child. X a transsexual male was in a long term relationship with Y, his female partner. 
Y had successfully conceived a child as a result of donor insemination. In the course 
of this treatment, X was required to consent to his being the father of the child in 
accordance with section 28(3) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. This 
is something that X did.  Section 28(3) states: 
 
If no man is treated, by virtue of subsection (2) above, as the father of the child but—  
 
 (a) the embryo or the sperm and eggs were placed in the woman, or she was 
artificially inseminated, in the course of treatment services provided for her and a man 
together by a person to whom a licence applies, and 
 
 (b) the creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the 
sperm of that man, 
then, subject to subsection (5) below, that man shall be treated as the father of the child. 
 
X subsequently enquired of the Registrar General whether there was an objection to 
his being registered as the resultant child’s father. In the reply, the view was taken 
that only someone who was born genetically a man could be acknowledged in this 
role. Subsequent to the birth of Z, the couple decided to try to register her in X’s name 
                                                
54  Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Draft HL Paper 169-I and HC 
Paper 630-I. Written and oral evidence published as Volume II. 
55  Case of X, Y AND Z v. The United Kingdom, (75/1995/581/667) Judgment, Strasbourg 22 April 
1997 http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/340.  
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anyway but this met with objection and only Y’s name was put on the register. The 
refusal to acknowledge X as a man for these purposes meant that when Z was born 
she was registered as the child of one parent. X and Y were told that Z could lawfully 
bear X’s surname, but only a biological man could be regarded as a father for the 
purposes of registration. As X was not considered to be a ‘man’ he could not marry Y, 
therefore the common law presumptions regarding fatherhood did not apply. 
 
Because the Registrar General took the view that only biological men would satisfy the 
requirements of section 28 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 that 
section could not apply to make X the father of his child.56  
 
The applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights that there had been 
a breach of Articles 8, 12, 13 and 14. The court rejected this claim in its entirety. Of 
particular interest is the court’s comment in relation to whether there had been a 
breach of Article 8. It was accepted that X, Y and Z were connected by de facto 
family ties and that they would be regarded as a ‘family’ for the purposes of Article 8. 
However, it was held that the State had a wide margin of appreciation in how it 
acknowledged the legal status of transsexuals as parents. The court also suggested that 
Z could be protected from the distress of X not being acknowledged as her father if 
X’s transsexual status were kept secret; that way his not being acknowledged on her 
birth certificate would be no different from other families where the father’s name 
was not on the birth certificate.  
 
The Court does not find it established that any particular stigma still attaches to children or 
families in such circumstances. 57  
 
                                                
56 C. Lind ‘Case Commentary: Perception Of Sex In The Legal Determination Of Fatherhood’ (1997) 
9 Child and Family Law Quarterly 401-408. 
57 Case of X, Y AND Z v. The United Kingdom, (75/1995/581/667) Judgment, Strasbourg 22 April 
1997 
http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/340. 
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This seems to be an unsatisfactory answer, especially when contrasted with the recent 
dicta of the Law Lords’ in Re R: 58 
 
… it is even more important that the very significant legal relationship of parenthood 
should not be based on a fiction (especially if the fiction involves a measure of deception by 
the mother).59 
 
X, Y and Z can also be contrasted with the approach of the legislature in the aftermath 
of R v HFEA, ex parte Diane Blood.60 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 allows for the name of deceased fathers to be named on 
birth certificates. The rationale for this Act is the importance of a parent being 
identified on a birth certificate even when this is likely to have little practical or legal 
effect. This perceived importance of having the name of the father on the birth 
certificate seems to have been overlooked in X, Y and Z.61  
 
B. Present & Future 
In the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Gender Recognition Act 2004, 
and with the changes proposed in the new Bill, how might transexual parental status 
be dealt with? We will next go through some scenarios, discussing the definitions of 
‘mother’ and ‘father’.62  
                                                
58 See S. Fovargue ‘Re R(IVF: Paternity of Child): assisting conception for the single infertile’ (2006) 
18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 423-444. 
59 Re R (IVF: Paternity of Child) [2005] 2 FLR 843 at 859 per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. 
 
60 R -v- HFEA Ex Parte Diane Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687. 
61 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
62 Given the current flux in the law we acknowledge that this may have changed by the time the paper 
goes to print. This is a commentary on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill as it stands at the 
time of writing. 
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Our scenarios look to the reproductive choices available to transsexuals. They 
expose some interesting problems with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act’s definitions of parents63: 
 
1) Jessica, a post-operative transsexual woman, stored sperm pre-operatively 
believing that the day would come when she could have a womb transplant 
and could use the sperm to gestate her own genetically related child. In 2009, 
she has a womb transplant and receives treatment at a fertility clinic. An 
embryo created with her sperm and a donor egg is implanted into her new 
womb. Nine months later she gives birth to a healthy baby. 
 
2) Rebecca, a post-operative transsexual woman, also stored sperm pre-
operatively. She and her partner Lois, in 2008, wish to use this sperm to 
artificially inseminate Lois so that Lois may carry their child. Lois is fertile 
and so the treatment is straightforward and without complication. Nine months 
later, Lois gives birth to a healthy baby. 
 
3) Martha, a post-operative transsexual woman, has stored sperm pre-operatively. 
She secures a surrogate who is implanted with an embryo created using this 
sperm and a donor egg. The surrogate gives birth to a healthy baby. Martha 
applies for a parental order under, what is now, section 30 of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 so that she can acquire parental rights. 
 
                                                
63 It could be argued that conceptual difficulties with parenthood are due to technological advances 
more generally. See L.J. Hill, ‘What does it mean to be a ‘parent’? The claims of biology as the basis 
for parental rights’ (1991) 66 New York University Law Review at 354 “In this manner, science has 
distilled the various phases of procreation- coitus, conception, and gestation- into their component 
parts, wreaking havoc on our prevailing conceptions of parenthood…”. 
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4) Tom, a post-operative transsexual man, has stored embryos pre-operatively. 
These embryos were created with Tom’s eggs and donor sperm. He and his 
wife, Jean, now wish to use these embryos. They want the embryos to be 
implanted into Jean’s womb so that she may gestate their child. The embryos 
are implanted, and nine months later Jean gives birth to a healthy baby boy. 
 
5) Mark, a post-operative transsexual male, has stored eggs pre-operatively. He 
and his partner, Paul, now wish to use these eggs in order to gestate a child. 
They seek to have the eggs fertilised with Paul’s sperm. The resultant embryos 
are placed into a surrogate’s womb. Nine months later a healthy baby boy is 
born. Mark and Paul apply for a parental order. 
 
How might the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (as amended by the current 
Bill) define parents for the purposes of the children’s birth certificates?64 
 
In our first scenario, having carried and gestated the child, Jessica would be 
the legal mother. Womb transplants (if successful) could allow transsexual women to 
enjoy the full status of ‘motherhood’. The Bill does not change the definition of 
‘mother’:  
 
The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an 
embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the 
child.65 
 
                                                
64 It is worth noting that defining parents according to a male/ female dichotomy is problematic in 
other areas. See the remarks of Lady Hale as reported in ‘Lesbians should both be called mother’ The 
Telegraph 
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/19/nlesbians119.xml Accessed 
20/06/2006. 
65 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, cl 33(1). 
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In addition to being the legal mother, having donated the sperm, Jessica would also be 
the genetic father, but, she would not be the legal father. If Jessica were married, or 
being treated together with a male partner, then her husband (or partner) would be the 
legal father of the child.66 If Jessica were in a civil partnership at the time of treatment 
(when the embryo was implanted into her transplanted womb) her partner would be 
treated as the parent of the child, unless it was shown that she (the partner) did not 
consent to the placing of an embryo into Jessica’s womb: 
 
If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial 
insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership, then subject to section 51(2) to (4), the 
other party to the civil partnership is to be treated as the parent of the child unless it is 
shown that she did not consent to the placing in W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or 
to her artificial insemination (as the case may be).67 
 
If Jessica is single then the answer would seem to be that she is the legal mother and 
the child is legally fatherless.68 However, this would not be the case. Clause 41 of the 
Bill deals with the circumstances in which a child may be legally fatherless. It states: 
 
(1) Where the sperm of a man who had given such consent as is required by paragraph 5 of 
Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act (consent to use of gametes for treatment of others) was used for 
a purpose for which such consent was required, he is not to be treated as the father of the 
child. 
 
We can see from paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act that the option of ‘legally fatherless’ is not applicable to this 
situation. 
 
5. (1) A person's gametes must not be used for the purposes of treatment services unless 
there is an effective consent by that person to their being so used and they are used in 
accordance with the terms of the consent. 
                                                
66 Ibid cl.35(1). 
67 Ibid cl..42(1). 
68 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, schedule 3, para 5. (as amended by Human 
Fertilisation and Embryo (Draft) Bill, s.41) . 
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    (2) A person's gametes must not be received for use for those purposes unless there is an 
effective consent by that person to their being so used.  
 
    (3) This paragraph does not apply to the use of a person's gametes for the purpose of 
that person, or that person and another together, receiving treatment services.69 
 
Subsection 3 states that the gametes used in situations which give rise to legally 
fatherless children can not be the gametes of the individual(s) seeking treatment. In 
this example, the child could not be legally fatherless as the sperm used belongs to 
Jessica. There is no reason why the sperm would not be considered to belong to 
Jessica. The following sections of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 can be 
interpreted as support for this. 
 
9. (1) Where a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, the person’s gender 
becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that, if the acquired gender is the male 
gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the female gender, the person’s 
sex becomes that of a woman). 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect things done, or events occurring, before the certificate 
is issued; but it does operate for the interpretation of enactments passed, and instruments 
and other documents made, before the certificate is issued (as well as those passed or made 
afterwards). 
 
If we take the above section to mean that the (legal) ‘person’ remains the same, 
before and after transition, then the stored sperm is the product of Jessica, the person 
wishing to use it. Jessica stored the sperm for the purposes of using it later. If in this 
case she had wished for the sperm to be used for anonymous donation then this 
decision would also still hold (although this may pose a problem to any future 
children wishing to gain access to information about their genetic parents 70 ). 
Anonymity is no longer guaranteed to those who donate sperm for use in assisted 
                                                
69 Ibid (emphasis ours). 
70 Gender Recognition Act, s.22: Prohibition on disclosure of information. 
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reproduction.71 We can see from this that the law can not account for cases like 
Jessica’s and does not provide a clear answer as to how the baby’s father is defined. 
The second case is more straightforward. Lois would be the legal mother. The 
definition of ‘mother’ is absolute and defined as the woman who gestates the child. 
As mentioned already, if Lois and Rebecca are in a civil partnership (and the current 
Bill goes through) then Rebecca could be the child’s ‘parent’ and, if the new changes 
are put into force then, even if Rebecca and Lois are not in a civil partnership, 
Rebecca could still be described as the parent according to clause 42(1) of the Bill. 
However, all of this is subject to the problem posed above about what is meant by 
‘legally fatherless’, and the use of the gametes belonging to one of the parties being 
‘treated together’. 
The third example again raises the problem that using the gametes of a party to 
treatment precludes the possibility of having a ‘legally fatherless’ child. In this case 
the surrogate would at first be the legal mother of the child. However, Martha could 
(if married/ in a civil partnership/ in an enduring relationship)72 make an application 
for a parental order under clause 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. 
If she is single, this option is not available to her, although she could still apply to 
adopt the child from the surrogate mother. The following section from the explanatory 
notes of the Bill describes the situation: 
 
185. In clause 54 there are new provisions extending the categories of couples who can 
apply for a parental order (fast track adoption) where a child has been conceived using the 
gametes of at least one of the couple, and has been carried by a surrogate mother. Currently, 
only married couples can apply for a parental order. Under the new provisions, civil 
partners would also be able to apply, as would unmarried opposite sex couples or same-sex 
couples not in a civil partnership. The other provisions relating to parental orders remain 
                                                
71 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 
2004. 
72 Again we acknowledge that this is so provided that the current Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Bill goes through. 
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the same as the existing provisions of the 1990 Act. A single person remains unable to 
apply, but would be able to apply to adopt the child from the surrogate mother.73 
 
It remains to be seen how the courts would treat applications for parental 
responsibility, based on genetic relatedness, by a transsexual who used gametes that 
they had stored pre-operatively. Whether such an individual would be acknowledged 
in the parental role which accorded with their gender or which accorded to their 
biological contribution is a further question to which current legislation provides no 
definitive answer. 
In the fourth scenario outlined above Tom would genetically be the ‘mother’ of 
the child. Having gestated the child Jean would be the legal mother; this is not 
affected by Tom’s eggs being used in the creation of the embryos as the following 
section from the explanatory notes states: 
 
Clause 47: Woman not to be other parent merely because of egg donation 
180. Clause 47 makes clear that where a woman has not carried a child she will only be 
treated as a parent of the child if the provisions relating to parenthood of the mother’s 
partner apply, or she has adopted the child. Egg donation will not make a woman the parent 
of a child carried by another woman. Parenthood could however be conferred by other legal 
provisions in this case (for example, if a woman donated an egg to her female partner, and 
the agreed female parenthood conditions were met in relation to her).74  
 
In this case, Tom would be recognised as the child’s father as he is married to Jean. 
Whether similar objections to those raised by the Registrar General in X, Y and Z v. 
The United Kingdom would also be raised in this case is unclear. Whether the Gender 
Recognition Act goes any way to resolving this also remains open to speculation.75 
 In the final scenario, Mark and Paul are in a similar situation to Martha. In this 
case the surrogate would be the legal mother and Paul the legal father. Mark could 
                                                
73 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, Explanatory Notes, p.33 (Italics ours).  
74 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, Explanatory Notes, 32. 
75 Again see the anecdotal evidence referred to in S. Sheldon ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation 
of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review  523-553; L. Smith ‘Is three a crowd? 
Lesbian mothers’ perspectives on parental status in law’ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
231-252. 
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make an application for a parental order under clause 54 of the Draft Bill or he could  
apply to adopt the child from the surrogate mother. 
 
All of these examples must be considered in light of section 12 of the Gender 
Recognition Act. This section deals with parentage and states that parental status will 
not be altered by the Act. 
 
The fact that a person's gender has become the acquired gender under this Act does not 
affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child. 76 
 
This section is open to considerable interpretation. If the section relates to children 
born prior to transitioning, because these children are entitled to keep the parents they 
are born with, then we are accepting the principle that novel accounts of parenthood 
can be acceptable. If the section relates to children born to a transsexual individual at 
any stage then it seems extreme and at odds with legislation in other areas. It creates 
the problem that Hill describes, where we have a definition that gives rise to 
theoretical order but is not in line with the common usage of the term.77 By forcing 
definitions to stretch so that males are acting as ‘mothers’ and females as ‘fathers’ we 
are tacitly accepting that enforced definitions of gender roles are more important than 
an acknowledgement of the reality of these situations. Defining parental roles 
according to gender rather than sex will not be a perfect solution for all those in novel 
parenting situations. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 states that the Children Act 1989 
should be amended such that:  
 
‘child of the family’, in relation to parties to a marriage, or to two people who are civil 
partners of each other, means- (a) a child of both of them, and (b) any other child, other 
                                                
76 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s.12. 
77 L.J. Hill, ‘What does it mean to be a ‘parent’? The claims of biology as the basis for parental rights’ 
(1991) 66 New York University Law Review 353-420. 
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than a child placed with them as foster parents by a local authority or voluntary 
organisation, who has been treated by both of them as a child of their family.78 
 
Gender specific parental roles will create confusion for same sex couples.79 This 
problem is one which the law is taking steps to address. However, as we have 
mentioned, there seems to be no attempt to bridge the gap between the reality of 
parenting for transsexual individuals and the situation at law. Where parental roles are 
still being attributed in accordance with the male/ female dichotomy they should be 
attributed in accordance with gender rather than sex. The current definitions of 
parents that exist at law are unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that it is evident 
that the law attempts to be flexible in how parents are defined in other aspects.80 No 
such flexibility is evident in the law relating to transsexuals. In fact the opposite is 
evident if we take section 12 as imposing an absolute prohibition on transsexuals 
being recognised in the parental role which would traditionally accord with their 
‘acquired’ gender. There seems to be strong arguments for not wishing to change the 
birth certificates of existing children. It could, for example, be the case that “the need 
to record the father’s name as a simple matter of recording ‘the historical truth’”.81 
For children born after transitioning, the injunction of section 12 may mean that they 
can not similarly record the truth- as is evident in our consideration of the effects that 
section 12 may have for Tom and Jean’s baby, as discussed above. 
 
                                                
78 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.75. 
79  B. Hale ‘Equality in Equal Measure’ The Sixth Annual Law Reports Lecture 18/06/2007 
http://www.lawreports.co.uk/AboutICLR/Lecture%20PDF/ICLRLecture2007Lady%20HaleTrans.pdf 
p.18 
Accessed on 26/06/2007. 
80 S. Sheldon ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review  523-553 at 530. 
81 S. Sheldon ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review  523-553 at 540. 
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These legal deficiencies could be resolved if the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill adopted a broader account of parents, specifically considering the 
needs of transsexuals. The examples serve to highlight the procedural difficulties that 
transsexual men and women may encounter in their quest to become parents. 
However these difficulties should not be sufficient to justify lack of counselling with 
regard to the choices available. Rather they show that we need to reconceptualise our 
account of what it is to be a parent. 
 
For parenthood to continue to be recognized as perhaps the most fundamental social 
relationship in our culture, carrying with it the basis for a number of basic human rights 
with which it has historically been associated, a continuity of core meaning must be 
maintained. To stipulate a meaning for ‘parenthood’ which is fundamentally distinct from 
the traditional way in which the term is used is to open the door to a changed, and perhaps 
diminished social significance for parenthood as an institution.82 
 
Rather than needing gender specific roles within the definition of ‘parent’, perhaps 
instead it could be acknowledged that there are variations that may or may not be 
present. This would largely be a reflection of the way that families exist at present; 
parents take many and varied forms and a child may typically have anything from one 
to four, with other less common variations also in existence. Parenting roles, while 
often still gender specific, are not always like this and more importantly need not be 
like this.83 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
                                                
82 L.J. Hill, ‘What does it mean to be a ‘parent’? The claims of biology as the basis for parental rights’ 
(1991) 66 New York University Law Review 353-420 at 361. 
83 J Risman ‘Intimate Relationships from a Microstructural Perspective: Men Who Mother’ (1987) 1 
Gender and Society, 6-32; A, Doucet, ‘Gender Equality and Gender Differences in Household Work 
and Parenting, (1995) 18, Women’s Studies International Forum, 271-284; A Doucet, ‘There’s a huge 
gulf between me as a male carer and women’: gender, domestic responsibility, and the community as 
an institutional arena’ (2000) 3 Community, Work and Family 163-184. 
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We must try to ensure where possible that our institutions do not advocate 
outdated heterosexist agendas. There are many ways in which social institutions and 
social policies re-enforce what are now arguably redundant beliefs about human 
beings only falling into two specific categories84 and the superiority of the male-
female relationship.85 Traditionally men and women both needed to be involved in the 
procreative process. This does not mean that this is the way the reproductive process 
should always be. Similarly, just because genetically related men were fathers and 
genetically related women were mothers does not mean that this is the way it should 
be. Genetic links are no longer necessary for parental status to be granted. Being a 
parent should not be merely a matter of biological fact. 
 Acknowledging transsexuals in the parental role of the ‘acquired’ gender is 
also consonant with how we have seen the law relating to marriage develop. 
Traditionally transsexuals could not enter into a valid marriage in their acquired 
gender.86 This was because for a marriage to be valid both a male and female needed 
to enter it, and the definition of ‘male’ and ‘female’ in accordance with the sex in 
which they were born.87 This position evolved from a sex-based to gender-based 
definitions of ‘male’ and ‘female’ allowing transsexual marriages to be recognised as 
valid. This move away from focusing on sex is welcomed for it compelled ‘a 
transsexual person to assume as a matter of law, a gender, which he or she may no 
                                                
84  R. De Sousa, ‘Gender Dichotomies, Sexual Continua, and Emotional Taxonomy’ 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/GENDEREMO.pdf Accessed on 03/11/2007. 
85 This is often described as: ‘heterosexism- discrimination or prejudice against homosexuals on the 
assumption that heterosexuality is the norm’ 
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/heterosexism?view=uk Accessed on 03/11/07. 
86 S. Gilmore, ‘Case Commentary Bellinger v Bellinger-- Not Quite Between the Ears And Between 
The Legs—Transsexualism and Marriage in the Lords’ (2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
295-311. 
87 Section 1(c) of the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971, re-enacted in section 11(c) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, provides that a marriage is void unless the parties are 'respectively male and female'. 
See also Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83, 104 and   Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21. 
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longer be capable of assuming as a matter of fact’.88 It could be suggested that the 
move towards a gender based account of parenting is not a move far enough. Why not 
dispense with the categories of mother and father altogether?89 This is not something 
that we would have a principled objection to. However, the argument we put forward 
is consonant with the law in similar areas. 
In the absence of clear and reliable data to support the contention that 
transsexuals are not fit to parent, the only reasons to exclude them from procreation 
are social prejudices and speculative concerns which simply can not justify depriving 
transsexuals of their chance to be parents. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, 
loss of reproductive potential should not be the price to pay when transitioning. When 
individuals undergo sex reassignment surgery, it is not a precondition that they waive 
any rights to parent, or that they must cease having contact with any existing children. 
Upon electing to undergo such surgery, the law does not mandate that any existing 
children be automatically removed and placed into care, and/or the transsexual parent 
be refused contact. Quite the opposite in fact; we insist that the parental status with 
regard to these children should remain secured. Support for this is found in the 
following extract from the explanatory notes for the Gender Recognition Act: 
 
Section 12: Parenthood 
43.     This provides that though a person is regarded as being of the acquired gender, the 
person will retain their original status as either father or mother of a child. The continuity of 
parental rights and responsibilities is thus ensured.90 
 
It would be arbitrary to assume that sex reassignment surgery automatically 
bars one from being a loving and caring parent. We should be consistent and 
                                                
88 S. Gilmore, ‘Case Commentary Bellinger v Bellinger-- Not Quite Between the Ears And Between 
The Legs—Transsexualism and Marriage in the Lords’ (2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
295-311. 
89 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
90 Gender Recognition Act: Explanatory Notes http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2004/2004en07.htm 
Accessed on 05/03/2008. 
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explicitly accept that there is no evidence to suggest that transsexuals fare any worse 
in the parenting domain, and thus we should make them aware that they can preserve 
their reproductive choices post surgery. We should also be consistent in recognising 
these individuals fully in their ‘acquired’ gender.  
